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Abstract
Serverless computing platforms currently rely on basic pricing schemes that are static and
do not reflect customer feedback. This leads to significant inefficiencies from a total utility
perspective. As one of the fastest-growing cloud services, serverless computing provides an
opportunity to better serve both users and providers through the incorporation of market-based
strategies for pricing and resource allocation. With the help of utility functions to model the
delay-sensitivity of customers, we propose a novel scheduler to allocate resources for server-
less computing. The resulting resource allocation scheme is optimal in the sense that it maxi-
mizes the aggregate utility of all users across the system, thus maximizing social welfare. Our
approach gives rise to a dynamic pricing scheme which is obtained by solving an optimiza-
tion problem in its dual form. We further develop feedback mechanisms that allow the cloud
provider to converge to optimal resource allocation, even when the users’ utilities are unknown.
Simulations show that our approach can track market demand and achieve significantly higher
social welfare (or, equivalently, cost savings for customers) as compared to existing schemes.
1 Introduction
This paper seeks to guide resource allocation in next-generation cloud computing systems. Specif-
ically, we focus on a recent cloud service called serverless computing that has garnered significant
attention from industry (e.g., Amazon Web Services (AWS) Lambda, Microsoft Azure Functions,
Google Cloud Functions) as well as the systems community (see, e.g., [1–5]), and is poised to be-
come “the next big thing” [5–8]. Just as cloud servers abstracted away physical servers in the past
decade, serverless computing systems are expected to abstract away today’s cloud servers in the
coming decade [6]. Indeed, according to the Berkeley view on Serverless Computing [5], serverless
systems are expected to dominate the cloud scenario and become the default computing paradigm
in the coming years while client-server based computing will witness a considerable decline.
∗Equal contribution. This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF-2007669, CCF-1704967, CCF-0939370, CIF-
1703678, CNSâA˘S¸1527846 and CCFâA˘S¸1618145.
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Current popular serverless providers—such as AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud—
charge users at the same constant rate across all users. This pricing scales linearly in time, memory,
and the number of jobs, regardless of the users’ applications. There are several reasons why this
pricing scheme philosophy needs to be reconsidered, as discussed below.
Serverless computing is a new ecosystem with a growing customer base. Currently, cloud
providers can schedule most of the jobs instantly as the resources exceed the demand [9]. How-
ever, this surplus luxury is not sustainable, with the expected growing demand of a large customer
base increasingly seeking serverless computing services [5, 7, 10]. The market share of serverless
computing is expected to grow by USD 9.16 billion at a CAGR close to 26% [11]. Hence it is
extremely desirable, and perhaps overdue, that we have a market-based pricing scheme that adapts
prices to the demand, and allocates resources to the users that need them the most. This is espe-
cially appealing due to the elasticity of the serverless model. Indeed, the typical jobs submitted to a
serverless system are comprised of simple functions that have relatively small system requirements
such as execution time and memory storage. Besides, these functions are stateless in the sense that
the function state is kept in storage and hence these functions can be viewed as standalone with
minimum dependence on other functions [2,5]. This allows us to treat each user’s job as comprised
of several independent unit functions that can be executed on a single serverless worker.
Another important feature of serverless systems is that it eliminates the up-front commitment
by the users. The jobs are typically triggered by external events (see [9] for examples of different
triggers). However, because of this the demand for resources can vary significantly over time
and it is necessary to allow the price rates to conform with this changing demand in real-time.
In particular, this will ensure that we serve the users who value their jobs the most during surge
periods and are willing to pay premium prices.
It is important to differentiate jobs based on their delay-sensitivity and allocate resources
accordingly—for example, urgent jobs (that need to be executed in real-time, such as model de-
ployment [12] and real-time video compression [13]) may need prioritization, whereas enduring
jobs (that can be put into queues with reasonable wait-times, such as optimization in machine
learning [14–17] and scientific computing [3, 6, 18]) could be put on hold. The pricing scheme
should provide appropriate incentives to the users. For example, premium rates could be applied
to urgent jobs, and discounts applied to enduring jobs. Current pricing schemes lack this feature
and charge each job the same regardless.
To address this issue, we develop a dynamic multi-tier pricing scheme that incentivizes users
to bid optimally for resources that are tailored to their requirements and delay-sensitivity charac-
teristics. To articulate the notion of demand and delay-sensitivity, we adopt the concept of utility
functions from economics, commonly used to measure user preferences over a set of goods and
services. We consider user utilities as a function of delays in job completion times. This enables
us to naturally differentiate jobs based on their delay-sensitivity characteristics and allocate the
resources optimally. Some examples of such utility functions are shown in Fig. 1 for three users.
User 1 obtains utility only when her job gets completed under 0.1 seconds. User 2 obtains di-
minishing returns as time passes. User 3, on the other hand, does not care as long as her job is
completed within 10000 seconds.
We set ourselves the goal of scheduling jobs so that the net utility gained by the users is max-
imized. We achieve this by formulating and solving an optimization problem that maximizes the
2
10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104
Time (seconds)
0
1
2
3
4
Ut
ilit
y
User 1
User 2
User 3
Figure 1: Examples of utility functions for 3 users that depend only on completion time.
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Figure 2: A block diagram schematic for the system problem
social welfare, i.e., the sum of the utilities received by all the users. Social welfare as a concept is
very important to many companies like Amazon that prioritize customer satisfaction1. A prototype
for our scheduler is shown in Figure 2. It takes as its input the job sizes and the utility functions for
each user, the capacity constraints or machine availability information from the cloud, and outputs
a job allocation schedule. Here, the job sizes capture the demand for resources, the utility func-
tions capture the delay-sensitivity of the users, and the capacity constraints capture the supply of
resources.
Existing dynamic pricing schemes: We note that several cloud providers already deploy dy-
namic pricing schemes for their services, such as Spot Instances in AWS EC2 and Spot Virtual
Machines in Microsoft Azure. However, these schemes do not take into account users’ prefer-
ences such as delay-sensitivity. Moreover, according to the hypothesis in [19], these prices are
usually not market-driven (that is, they are independent of client bids) and are generated at ran-
dom from within a tight price interval via a dynamic hidden reserve price. Further, these schemes
are currently limited to only serverful/Virtual Machine (VM) based systems and to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to propose a dynamic pricing scheme for serverless systems.
Willingness-to-pay as a proxy for utility: In practice, the service provider does not have
access to the users’ utility functions. Indeed, a utility function is an abstract concept used to
capture the delay-sensitivity of the users and oftentimes the users themselves are unaware of their
utility functions. We will consider the relatively more tangible notion of willingness to pay in lieu
of the utility function. For example, if a user is willing to pay a maximum of 1$ for her job to
get completed with a delay of 1 minute, then we will say that her utility function takes value 1$ at
t = 1 minute. In Fig. 1, user 1 is willing to pay more than user 3 to get her job completed within
0.1 seconds.
Incentivizing truthful reporting: Certainly, the service provider still needs to procure this
willingness to pay information from the users in a truthful manner. We propose a pricing scheme
1For example, see https://www.amazon.jobs/en/principles
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that ensures that the users cannot gain by faking their willingness to pay. In our proposed pricing
scheme the users are not necessarily charged by the full amount of their willingness to pay. Instead,
the amount charged depends on the net demand and the willingness to pay of all the users with the
additional feature that no user under any circumstances is charged more than her willingness to
pay.2
Utility-agnostic approach: Usually, it is undesirable to demand the users to report their will-
ingness to pay. Firstly, because it is a function of time and could be hard to communicate. Even if
we consider a family of typical utility functions, there could exist certain privacy concerns under
which users are reluctant to report their utility functions. To mitigate this, inspired by the seminal
works in [20, 21], we decompose the scheduler optimization problem into user problems—one for
each user—and a cloud problem. Each user problem interacts with the cloud problem through the
prices published by the cloud provider and the corresponding budget responses from the users. We
prove that under equilibrium conditions, the above decomposition solves the original scheduler op-
timization problem. However, in this framework the users need to report only their optimal budget
responses which is a finite vector of the size of the number of service tiers offered. A users budget
response is a function of her utility function and the prices published by the cloud. This inserts a
filter between the utility functions of the users and their reports to the network providing them a
layer of privacy and making the communication between the cloud and the users feasible. Thus,
the above decomposition allows us to track the optimal performance with limited feedback from
users in the form of their budget responses. We demonstrate the viability of our approach through
simulations.
In situations where it is infeasible to get budget responses from the users at a desired response
rate in order to run the optimization algorithm, it is possible to emulate it as follows: Locally, on
the users side, we let each user choose her willingness to pay from a list of options that best suits
her needs. Using this willingness to pay, a local algorithm computes the optimal budget response
to the prices published by the user and transfers only the budget signals to the cloud keeping the
willingness to pay information encrypted locally. Besides, an attractive feature of such a scheme is
that the users can update their willingness to pay at their disposal and the local algorithm will use
the most recent choice (see Fig. 4 for an illustration). Our algorithm can be interpreted as a protocol
between the users and the server for optimal resource allocation and fair pricing (further explained
in Sec. 4). This can be viewed as the scheduling analog of the window-based bandwidth allocation
method in TCP protocol that has revolutionized the field of network resource allocation [22–24].
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe our
model for scheduling jobs in a serverless system. We focus on the static problem of a single run
of the scheduler, which allocates resources to different jobs in different tiers. For this purpose, we
formulate our scheduling problem as an optimization problem to maximize the net social welfare.
This gives us a method to allocate resources optimally in each round of scheduling. We note
that the formulated optimization problem is NP-hard in general and consider an LP-relaxation of
this problem instead. In section 3, we further analyse this problem, provide an upper bound on
the gap between the original optimization problem and its relaxation, and decompose it into user
2This is similar to the dynamic pricing schemes currently deployed in service providers such as AWS spot pricing
for EC2, where the user defines the maximum price she is willing to pay. However, we take into account the market
fluctuations and user preferences such as delay-sensitivity unlike the naive schemes currently implemented [19].
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problems–one for each user–and a cloud problem. This gives rise to equilibrium prices for each
tier corresponding to the optimal resource allocation. In section 4, using the ideas developed in the
previous two sections we propose an algorithm to allocate resources across different tiers in the
subsequent runs of the scheduler and give a gradient-based pricing scheme to track the equilibrium
prices. In section 5, we give a market simulation to study the effect of multi-tier dynamic pricing
on social welfare and prices and compare it with basic pricing schemes. We conclude our paper
in section 6 with a few exciting open problems of interest to the research community like machine
heterogeneity and job dependencies, and other important considerations for pricing like wholesale
discount and user risk-preferences and fault-tolerance. To maintain continuity in reading, we defer
all the proofs to section 7.
2 Problem Formulation
Serverless (also called Function-as-a-service) as a cloud computing framework is ideal for “simple"
jobs where each user submits a function to be executed on serverless workers. Each user can
request for a job comprising of any number of executions of her function at any time, which could
be triggered due to external events. For example, the users can provide the conditions under which
they require the execution of a certain number of instances of their function. The users provide
these trigger event details along with their function submissions. Our goal here is to design an
efficient real-time job scheduler to allocate resources to the jobs that have been triggered across
multiple users and a corresponding pricing scheme for the cloud provider.
We envision a job scheduler that operates periodically (say every 0.1 seconds) and schedules
the jobs that are currently in its queue. This queue consists of all the jobs that have been triggered
and are ready to be executed but have not been scheduled yet. Thus, it consists of previously
unscheduled jobs (complete or partial) plus any new jobs that arrived since the previous scheduling
run. We assume that each function execution requires one serverless worker and takes unit time
(e.g., 100 ms). Also, a user derives utility only when her job is completed, that is, when all the
functions comprising her job are executed. Thus, we focus on the case where user utilities are only
a function of job completion times, and let the respective delay-sensitivity for user i be captured
by a utility function Ui : [0,∞)→ R. That is, user i obtains utility Ui(τ) if her job is completed at
time instant τ(> 0), whereUi(·) is non-increasing. Let Ji denote the number of function executions
needed to complete the job of user i. We call this the size of user i’s job. For example, it could be
a single function instance in which case Ji = 1 or a batch job of size Ji > 1.
We think of the scheduler as allocating resources to the users in different service tiers based on
their execution times—some jobs will be scheduled for immediate execution, whereas others will
be scheduled for execution at later times in the future. The jobs that are not scheduled will remain
in the queue to be scheduled by the scheduler at later operations. Note that the jobs that have been
scheduled for execution at a future point are removed from the queue. Let T be the maximum
number of service tiers offered by the cloud provider, and let the t-th tier be characterized by the
end time of this tier given by τt. For example, if T = 5, then the five tiers can correspond to job
completion under 1 second, 10 seconds, 10 minutes, 1 hour and 10 hours, respectively. Notice that
the end times of the different tiers in our model need not be evenly spaced. This is a useful feature
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because it allows our scheduler to plan over longer time horizons with a limited number of tiers.
The pricing for these different tiers of service should ideally decrease as the job completion time
increases.
We refer to the intervening time between the adjacent tier end times as service intervals. Con-
tinuing the previous example, service interval 1 starts at 0 and ends at 1 second, service interval
2 starts at 1 second and ends at 10 seconds, etc. Note that the functions in a single user’s job
can be served across several service intervals, but has a unique tier when all these functions are
completed. Further, let Mt be the constraint on the number of machines available for the scheduler
to allocate resources in service interval t. For example, if 500 machines are available every 100ms
and tier 1 is one second, then M1 = 500 ∗ (1/0.1) = 5000. Similarly, if tier 2 is 10 seconds, then
the number of machines available for tier 2 jobs are 500 ∗ (10/0.1) − 5000 = 45, 000. However,
we would like to retain some portion of this for the subsequent operations of our scheduler. This
will allow the scheduler to allocate resources for urgent jobs arriving in the future. Say we decide
to utilize at most 20% of these machines, then M2 = 45, 000 ∗ (0.2) = 9000. More generally, Mt
would depend on several factors like machine occupancy by pre-scheduled jobs, retained machines
for future scheduling, a margin to account for system uncertainties, etc.
System Problem: At each implementation of the scheduler, we assume that the scheduler has
access to the unscheduled jobs ready to be executed (say job of size Ji for user i), their utility func-
tions adjusted for past delay (for example, if a job has been waiting in queue for time τ0, then we
take its utility function to be Ui(τ + τ0)), and the machine availability Mt for each service interval
t. The scheduler then outputs a feasible allocation of serverless workers across different service
intervals. Let xit denote the number of functions executed for agent i ∈ [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N} at
service interval t ∈ [T ] := {1, 2, . . . , T}. Let x be the N × T matrix with entries [x]it = xit,
i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ].
Let U ti := Ui(τt) denote user i’s utility if her job is completed in tier t, where τt is the end time
of tier t. Then
Ti := min{t ∈ [T ] :
t∑
s=1
xis ≥ Ji}, (2.1)
is the time it takes to complete user i’s Ji functions, awarding her a utility of UTii . (If a user’s job is
not completed we let Ti = T + 1 and assign her zero utility.) Also, at any service interval t ∈ [T ],
since the number of function executions cannot exceed the cloud service provider’s capacity, we
have
∑N
i=1 xit ≤ Mt. To this end, we formulate the system problem SYS that maximizes the sum
utility of the system as follows (see Fig. 2 for an illustration):
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SYS
Maximize
xit≥0
n∑
i=1
UTii
subject to
N∑
i=1
xit ≤Mt, ∀ t ∈ [T ], (2.2)
Ti = min{t ∈ [T ] :
t∑
s=1
xis ≥ Ji}, ∀ i ∈ [N ]. (2.3)
In general, SYS can have multiple solutions, but there always exists a solution that assumes a
special form. Specifically, it corresponds to a non-preemptive scheduling, where the resources are
allocated so that none of the users’ jobs are interrupted in the middle of the execution and made
to wait till its execution resumes at a later stage after serving other users. We first outline a rough
sketch of the underlying intuition and then establish this result in Lemma 2.1. Since the utilities
of users depend only on their job completion times, it is suboptimal to leave a user hanging by
allocating partial resources (which provides no utility gain). For example, say user i has been
allocated a total of
∑t
s=1 xis(< Ji) machines till the end of service interval t, for some 1 ≤ t < T ,
and then interrupted, i.e. xi(t+1) = 0. Further, let there be a user j( 6= i) that is allocated resources
in the service interval t+ 1. If user i’s job completes before user j, then we can swap the function
executions of user i at times > t + 1 with the foremost function executions of user j without
reducing the sum utility, since such a swap will only possibly reduce the completion time of user i
without affecting that of user j. On the other hand, if user j’s job completes before user i, then we
can swap the function executions of user i at times ≤ t with the hindmost function executions of
user j without reducing the sum utility, since such a swap will only reduce the completion time of
user j without affecting that of user i.
Corresponding to any non-preemptive scheduling, there exists an implicitly defined priority
ordering amongst the users based on their completion times. Without loss of generality, suppose
that this ordering is 1 ← 2 ← 3 ← · · · ← N , that is, user i is served along or before user i + 1
for all i ∈ [N − 1]. A simple greedy allocation x˜ = [x˜it] corresponding to this priority ordering
would work as follows: Say the cloud has served the first i−1 users till time t. Now, if the number
of machines remaining at time t is greater than Ji, all of user i’s functions are allocated at time t.
Otherwise, the cloud provider continues allocating resources at times > t to user i till her job is
complete before attending the user i+ 1. This process continues till either all users or all of the T
tiers are served.
Lemma 2.1 (Non-preemptive scheduling). There exists an optimal solution to SYS that allocates
resources to users in an uninterrupted fashion, that is, if user i gets allocated some resources, the
system would allocate Ji resources to user i (possibly across multiple service intervals) instead of
halting it and attending other users.
Remark 2.2. Corresponding to the greedy allocation with a given ordering, when the cloud provider
moves from tier t to t + 1, there can be at most one user with a partially satisfied job, for all
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t ∈ [T ]. Hence, there are at most T instances such that the users jobs are partially allocated, that
is, |{(i, t) : 0 < xit < Ji}| ≤ T . Further, there are at most N entries in the matrix x such that
xit = 1. Thus, the allocation matrix [xit], i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] is at most (N + T )–sparse.
Let uit := U ti − U t+1i , ∀i, t, where we assume that UT+1i := 0,∀i, consistent with the fact that
we assign zero utility if the jobs are not completed. Thus, uit ≥ 0,∀i, t, as Ui(·)’s are monotoni-
cally decreasing. Condition (2.3) in problem SYS is not favorable from an optimization framework
point of view. Hence, we introduce an indicator variable yit,∀i, t, that we use as a proxy to indicate
whether user i’s job is completed on or before time t. Let y := [yit], i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]. With these
variables, the scheduler optimization can be formulated as follows:
SYS-ILP
Maximize
xit≥0,yit∈{0,1}
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
uityit
subject to yit ≤
∑t
s=1 xis
Ji
,∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], (2.4)
N∑
i=1
xit ≤Mt, ∀ t ∈ [T ]. (2.5)
If x is a feasible solution for SYS, then defining yit,∀i, t, to be equal to 1 if user i’s job is
completed by time t and equal to zero otherwise, we observe that x,y is a feasible solution to
SYS-ILP with the same objective value as that of SYS with x. On the other hand, if x,y is a
feasible solution for SYS-ILP, then defining Ti = min{t ∈ [T ] : yit > 0} for all i ∈ [N ], we get
that it forms a feasible solution for SYS with the same objective value. This gives us an equivalence
between the problems SYS and SYS-ILP. Problem SYS-ILP can be solved using Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) methods available in computing frameworks such as MATLAB [25]
for sufficiently small N and T .
Remark 2.3. We note that the problems SYS/SYS-ILP are NP-hard in general. In [26], the authors
consider a job scheduling problem for N jobs, with execution times {J1, . . . , JN}, to be executed
on a single machine, where each job has a corresponding due date di. The utility function for each
job is assumed to decrease by its tardiness defined as the delay in the completion of job i from
its due date di. Namely, if Ti is the completion time of job i, then let Di(Ti) := max{0, Ti − di}
be the tardiness. The authors show that the problem of finding a schedule that minimizes the
total tardiness is NP-hard in general (see [26–28]). Further, this is proved for the case when the
parameters Ji and di, for all i, take integer values. Note that this is a special case of our problem
where the utility functions are UTii = Di(T +1)−Di(Ti), for all i, and the resource capacities are
Mt = 1 for all t. Thus it implies that our problem is NP-hard, too, in general.
Relaxing SYS-ILP: Although SYS/SYS-ILP are NP-hard in general, they can be solved ap-
proximately by relaxing the integer constraints. Let us replace the constraint yit ∈ {0, 1} by
0 ≤ yit ≤ 1. Since uit ≥ 0, the optimal y∗it for the relaxed problem is attained when the con-
straint (2.4) is satisfied with equality for all i, t as long as yi,t ≤ 1. Hence, we can substitute
yit =
∑t
s=1 xis/Ji in the objective function and introduce an additional constraint,
∑T
t=1 xit ≤ Ji,
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for all i, to ensure that yi,t ≤ 1. Fractional yit represents the fraction of functions completed for user
i at time t, and the system is awarded a utility per function depending on the tiers in which these
functions are executed unlike depending on the completion time of all functions considered earlier.
Letting Pit := U ti /Ji denote the utility per unit function, for all i and t, and making appropriate
substitutions in SYS-ILP, we get
SYS-LP
Maximize
xit≥0
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
xitPit
subject to
T∑
t=1
xit ≤ Ji, ∀ i ∈ [N ], (2.6)
N∑
i=1
xit ≤Mt, ∀ t ∈ [T ]. (2.7)
The nice LP form of SYS-LP would later allow us to devise pricing mechanisms for resource
allocation, similar to the network resource allocation schemes in [20, 21]. In particular, the dual
variable µt corresponding to the constraint (2.7) plays the role of an auxiliary price (or a shadow
price) for the t-th service tier (more on this in Sec. 4).
Let V ∗ be the optimum sum utility of the system in SYS/SYS-ILP. Let V R denote the optimum
value for the relaxed problem SYS-LP (which is obtained by relaxing the integer constraints on
yit). It is clear that V R ≥ V ∗, since V R is obtained by relaxing the integer constraints. Let xR be
the corresponding resource allocation matrix that achieves the optimum value V R in SYS-LP. Let
yR be the corresponding matrix given by
yRit :=
t∑
s=1
xis/Ji. (2.8)
We define the matrix yˆ ∈ RN×T with entries
yˆit :=
{
0, if yRit < 1,
1, if yRit = 1,
∀i, t. (2.9)
We can verify that xR, yˆ is a feasible solution for SYS-ILP. Let Vˆ denote the value of the objective
in SYS-ILP at xR, yˆ. Then, since Vˆ is one possible solution to SYS-ILP (whose optimal solution
is V ∗), we have
V R ≥ V ∗ ≥ Vˆ . (2.10)
Later, we show that the inequality gap (V ∗ − Vˆ ) is small. Note that this implies that the gap
(V ∗ − V R) is small. To that end, we first analyze the problem SYS-LP in more detail.
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3 Analyzing SYS-LP
Consider the Lagrangian corresponding to the optimization problem SYS-LP,
L(x,λ,µ) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
xitPit + λi
(
Ji −
N∑
i=1
xit
)
+ µt
(
Mt −
T∑
t=1
xit
)
=
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(Pit − µt − λi)xit +
T∑
t=1
µtMt +
N∑
i=1
λiJi, (3.1)
where x = [xit], i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], is the primal variable matrix and λ = [λi], i ∈ [N ], and
µ = [µt], t ∈ [T ], are the dual variable vectors corresponding to the constraints in (2.6) and (2.7),
respectively. Here, µ is the auxiliary price vector for the T service tiers that comes out of the
resource allocation problem. Thus,
∂L
∂xit
= Pit − µt − λi, ∀i, t;
∂L
∂λi
= Ji −
N∑
i=1
xit ∀i;
∂L
∂µt
=M −
T∑
t=1
xit, ∀t.
Hence, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [29] imply that
µt + λi
{
= Pit, if xit > 0,
≥ Pit, if xit = 0,
∀i, t, (3.2)
N∑
i=1
xit
{
=Mt, if µt > 0,
≤Mt, if µt = 0,
∀t, (3.3)
T∑
t=1
xit
{
= Ji, if λi > 0,
≤ Ji, if λi = 0,
∀i. (3.4)
SYS-LP solution is sparse: Note that when xit > 0, we have µt + λi = Pit from the KKT
condition in Eq. (3.2). Since µ ∈ RT and λ ∈ RN , N + T such equations suffice to solve for µ
and λ. Thus, in general, when the Pit’s do not satisfy any special relation, there can be at most
N + T instances where xit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] is non-zero, implying that xit is (N + T )-sparse.
Delving further into the details of resource allocation, we know that every time a user i gets non-
zero resources allocated in multiple tiers, say t1 and t2, we have µt1+λi = Pit1 and µt2+λi = Pit2 .
This implies that
µt1 − µt2 = Pit1 − Pit2 . (3.5)
Hence, every time any user gets partial resources (that is, less than the total job size) allocated
in one tier, we get one relation of the form (3.5). If there are more than T instances of such
10
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Number of machines (M)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
10
0*
(V
R
V)
/V
R
Figure 3: Percentage error between V R (the utility obtained with SYS-LP problem) and Vˆ (the
utility obtained by applying integer constraints on SYS-LP solution).
partial resource allocation, then we can eliminate the variables µt, t ∈ [T ], to get a non-trivial
relation amongst the variables Pit’s. In a generic case, where the Pit’s are any real numbers, it
is unlikely that such a non-trivial relation amongst the variables Pit’s is satisfied. For example, if
we consider a scenario where the Pit’s are sampled independently and uniformly from intervals
[Pit, Pit] (where Pit < Pit), for all i, t, then we observe that the probability of the event that a
non-trivial relation amongst the variables Pit’s holds is zero. Thus for any choice of T +1 instance
of partial allocations, we get a non-trivial relation amongst the variables Pit’s and the probability
of this happening is zero. Since there are finitely many choices for such T + 1 instances of partial
allocation, we get that the probability of there being more than T partial allocations is zero. Thus,
in a generic case in the sense above, there can be at most T instances where the users are allocated
partial resources. Moreover, there are at mostN instances where the users get their jobs completed.
Hence, xit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] is (N + T )-sparse (cf. Remark 2.2).
Recall that as a result of Lemma 2.1, we know that the optimal resource allocation in SYS is
(N + T )-sparse. Sparsity in both SYS and SYS-LP solutions suggests that the resource allocation
in the two cases is similar. In theorem 3.1, we formally bound the gap, V R − V ∗, between the
objectives of SYS and SYS-LP problems.
Theorem 3.1. Let V ∗ and V R be the optimal objectives of the problem in SYS and SYS-LP, respec-
tively. If the solution to SYS-LP xR ∈ RN×T is (N + T )-sparse, then, we have
V ∗ ≥
(
1− T (maxi Ji)
mintMt
)
V R. (3.6)
Thus, the relaxation from SYS-ILP to SYS-LP does not sacrifice much in terms of optimality.
This can also be noted from Fig. 3, where we plot the mean and standard deviation of the percent-
age error between V R and Vˆ , that is, 100 ∗ (V R − Vˆ )/V R over 20 independent trials for T = 5
tiers and N = 100 users, where utilities and job sizes are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) across users, and E[Ji] = 50, ∀ i. We have taken Mt(= M) constant across tiers. Recall
that the plot is an upper bound on the percentage error between V R and V ∗.
Remark 3.2. Suppose, in addition to the matrix xR being (N + T )-sparse, we know that the al-
location xR allocates partial resources to at most one user in any slot t as is typical in a greedy
allocation (see Remark 2.2). Then, in the proof of Theorem 3.1 (see section 7), we have |St| ≤ 1,
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for all t (where St is the set of users that are allocated partial resources in tier t), and we can
improve the bound to get,
V ∗ ≥
(
1− maxi Ji
mintMt
)
V R.
Premium services are charged more: We now give a toy example to illustrate some of the
features of our pricing scheme. Consider a system with N = 3 users having utility functions
as shown in Fig. 1. Let the total job size for each user be 10. Let the cloud provider allocate
resources in T = 3 tiers corresponding to job completion under 0.1, 10 and 1000 seconds. Also,
let Mt = 10 for t = 1, 2, 3. Thus, according to the utilities shown in Fig. 1, the 3× 3 utility matrix
U = [Ui(t)| i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}] is given by
U =
3 0 04 2.5 1
2 2 2
 .
For both SYS and SYS-LP, the following resource allocation is optimal:
xit :=
{
10, if i = t,
0, if i 6= t, ∀ i, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (3.7)
The above allocation makes intuitive sense because it maximizes the sum utility of the system by
maximizing the individual utility of the users. Any vector µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) such that 0.15 ≤ µ1 ≤
0.3, 0 ≤ µ2 ≤ 0.25, 0 ≤ µ3 ≤ 0.2, µ1 − µ2 ≥ 0.15 and µ2 ≥ µ3 serves as an auxiliary pricing
vector for the three tiers corresponding to the above optimal resource allocation. (Observe that if
we take λ1 = 0.3− µ1, λ2 = 0.25− µ2, and λ3 = 0.2− µ3, then the KKT conditions (3.2), (3.3),
and (3.4) are satisfied.) An example of such an auxiliary pricing vector for the three service tiers
is given by µ = [0.259, 0.083, 0.048] (obtained through the CVX optimizer from [29]). Note that in
our scheme, the cloud provider sets prices for different service tiers proportional to µ. Thus, user
1 is charged more for getting her job completed in tier 1 as opposed to user 3 who is charged less
for being flexible. Note that this is also better than a myopic greedy allocation where user 2 would
have been selected first based on her high utility value in the first tier. Our pricing scheme thus
takes into account the users’ delay-sensitivity and charges each user accordingly. The conditions
on µ show that a flat pricing scheme cannot achieve this result in our toy example setting.
4 Pricing Mechanisms to Learn User Utilities
In the previous section, we assumed that the utilities of the users are known to the cloud service
provider. This is not true in general. However, through dynamic pricing and users’ responses to
this pricing, the cloud service provider can converge to the optimal scheduling and pricing. Such
pricing mechanisms have been studied in economics for two-sided (supply and demand) markets
and are called Walrasian auctions [30, 31]. In the networking literature, Kelly has used similar
mechanisms to allocate bandwidth optimally over a network [20, 21].
In this section, we devise dynamic pricing schemes that would help the cloud provider to max-
imize the utility of the system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to study dynamic
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pricing mechanisms for scheduling problems. This is a promising research direction with poten-
tially high impact on the economics and resource allocation of next-generation computing systems.
Next, we derive an algorithm that sets pricing for cloud resources without assuming that the users’
utilities are known.
We first decompose the system problem from the i-th user’s perspective and from the cloud
provider’s perspective. To introduce the user feedback, we define a new variable mit, which can
be thought of as the budget of user i for service interval t. Thus, if µt is the price set by the cloud
service provider at service interval t, then the amount of resources allocated to the i-th user in
service interval t is given by xit = mit/µt. With this interpretation in mind, we formulate the user
problem for the i-th user by taking the terms from the Lagrangian of the system formulation (Eq.
(3.1)) that are relevant to the i-th user along with the constraint on the number of functions in her
job (Eq. (2.6)).
USER(i)
Maximize
mit≥0
T∑
t=1
mit
µt
(Pit − µt)
subject to
T∑
t=1
mit
µt
≤ Ji. (4.1)
The i-th user thus allocates a larger budget mit at time t if the user utility per function at time
t, Pit, is sufficiently larger than the price µt set by the cloud service provider. Given a price
vector µ = [µt], t ∈ [T ], the i-th user solves the USER(i) problem to obtain the budget vector
mit, t ∈ [T ]. The cloud provider then receives budgets from all users mit, t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], and
solves the CLOUD problem defined as follows:
CLOUD
Maximize
xit≥0
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
mit log xit
subject to
N∑
i=1
xit ≤M, ∀ t ∈ [T ]. (4.2)
Theorem 4.1. There exist equilibrium matrices x = (xit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]) and m = (mit, i ∈
[N ], t ∈ [T ]), and an equilibrium price vector µ = (µt, t ∈ [T ]) such that
(i) mi = (mit, t ∈ [T ]) solves USER(i), ∀ i ∈ [N ],
(ii) x = (xit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]) solves the CLOUD problem,
(iii) mit = xitqt, for all i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ],
(iv) for any t, if
∑
i xit < Mt, then qt = 0.
Further, if any matrix x = (xit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]) that is at equilibrium, i.e. has a corresponding
matrix m and a vector µ that together satisfy (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), then x solves the system
problem SYS-LP.
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Condition (i) says that the equilibrium budgets (mit, t ∈ [T ]) form an optimum response by
the user i to the equilibrium rates (µt, t ∈ [T ]). Condition (ii) says that the equilibrium allocation
matrix x is the solution to the CLOUD problem with respect to the equilibrium budgetsm. Further,
the allocations, prices and the budgets are consistent under equilibrium, i.e. mit = xitµt as per our
interpretation of budgets (from condition (iii)). And finally, (iv) says that the price µt = 0 if that
corresponding service interval is not full, i.e.
∑
i xit < Mt.
Price tracking using gradient descent: In many cases, it is easier to work with the dual
problem because there are less variables involved. For example, for the CLOUD problem, the
primal has NT variables, which can be significantly large in comparison to only T variables in the
dual problem (coming from T constraints in the primal). Moreover, working on the dual problem
allows the cloud provider to work directly on the price vector q, which is what it shows to the
users. We can derive the following dual problem for the CLOUD problem using the Lagrangian
L(x,q) in Eq. (7.11).
Maximize
qt≥0
T∑
t=1
log qt
(
N∑
i=1
mit
)
−
(
T∑
t=1
Mtqt
)
. (4.3)
The gradient of the above objective w.r.t. qt is given by
(∑N
i=1mit
qt
−Mt
)
∀ t ∈ [T ]. We use
gradient descent to solve Eq. (4.3) and make the pricing scheme q track users’ budgets m.
Next, based on our results in this section, we derive an algorithm where the cloud provider
updates the prices of its resources. Here, we assume that the user utilities are not known to the
cloud provider (which is generally the case) but they provide their budget information (represented
as the m matrix in the USER/CLOUD problems) on a semi-regular basis which is determined
based on the current price vector (represented as q in the USER/CLOUD problems) shown by the
cloud service provider (see Alg. 1).
An illustration of the process is provided in Fig. 4. Further, for N = 100 users, T = 5 hours
and i.i.d. users’ utilities and job sizes, we plot the results of Algorithm 1 (with gradient steps
G = 40 and step-size κ = 10−6) in Fig. 5. After only ∼10 iterations (budget/pricing updates),
the tracking-based scheme converges to the optimal solution (Fig. 5a). Moreover, as shown in Fig.
5b, with only slight changes in its pricing scheme, the cloud provider is able to nudge the users to
change their budgets to match the optimal solution.
5 A Market Simulation
In this section, we run an experiment for 60 days with N = 100 users and T = 5 tiers, where each
day, users’ utilities are changing based on the market trends3. Specifically, for the first 30 days,
we synthetically generate utilities that follow an upward trend based on the market following by
a downward trend for the next 30 days. To simulate this, we generate uit,∀ i, t, from a uniform
distribution in [5, 10] in an i.i.d. fashion. The job size for the i-th user, Ji ∀ i, is an i.i.d. integer
3An implementation of the price tracking algorithm (Alg. 1) and the market simulation described in this paper is
available at: https://github.com/vvipgupta/serverless-resource-allocation-and-pricing
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Algorithm 1: Finding the optimal resource allocation and pricing without utility information
at the cloud end
Input: Total number of machines M , step-size κ, error tolerance , gradient steps G, job
sizes Ji and utilities Ui(·) that are known only to user i for i ∈ [N ]
1 Initialization: Cloud service provider shows some initial prices q = q0 ∈ RT (say, the all
ones vector)
2 while ‖q− qprev‖ ≥ ‖qprev‖ do
3 qprev = q
4 Users, for all, i ∈ [N ], solve for budget vector mi ∈ RT using the price vector q in the
USER(i) problem
5 The cloud service provider receives the budget matrix m and does the following
6 step = 0
7 while step ≤ G do
8 qt = max
[
qt + κ
(∑N
i=1mit
qt(τ)
−Mt
)
, 0
]
∀ t ∈ [T ]
9 step = step+ 1
10 end
11 end
12 q∗ = q,m∗ =m
13 x∗it = m
∗
it/q
∗
t for all i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]
Result: Solution to SYS, that is, the optimal pricing vector q∗ and the optimal resource
allocation vector x∗
chosen between 10 to 100 (which remains constant throughout the 60 days of the experiment) and
Mt = 5000 for all t. To generate an upward market trend, we add 0.5 to uit,∀ i, t, with probability
0.55 and −0.5 with probability 0.45 (the probabilities are flipped to generate a downward trend). 4
We compare the following three schemes:
• Optimal pricing: Here, we assume that the cloud provider is able to solve for optimal
resource allocation and maximize system utility by utilizing the knowledge of users’ utilities
at each day.
• Tracking-based pricing: In this case, the users’ utilities are not known, and the cloud
provider tracks users’ utilities based on their budget signals (as described in Algorithm 1).
The cloud provider is assumed to update the prices everyday. Users send budget signals only
once per day. These budget signals depend on the user’s utility function on that day and the
prices published by the cloud on that day.
• First-come-first-serve: Here, the pricing of the resources remains constant (as currently
employed by most commercial service providers). It is the optimum prices determined by
the utilities on day 1 and does not capture the mood of the market. Each day, the users are
allocated resources on a first-come-first-serve (which is assumed to be random in order) or a
lottery basis.
4Note that the user problem can have multiple solutions. To ensure convergence to a unique solution with algo-
rithm 1, we add a small quadratic regularizer to both SYS-LP and the user problem.
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The cloud black-box runs Algorithm 1 to update the prices using the budget signals from the user
black-boxes and the capacity constraints from the cloud.
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Figure 5: Finding the SYS-LP solution through price tracking (Algorithm 1). The algorithm con-
verges after ∼10 iterations.
In Fig. 6, we plot the sum utility of the system for all the three schemes across 60 days. Note
that the tracking-based scheme accurately captures the trends of the market and is always within
8% of the optimal utility, and this happens with only limited feedback from users (where they send
budget signals only once per day). The first-come-first-serve scheme is clearly suboptimal with a
deviation of as much as 38% from the optimal utility.
In Fig. 7, we plot the utility and price charged across all users only in the first tier. Again,
the tracking-based scheme closely follows the optimal utility and lies within 3% of it (Fig. 7a).
Furthermore, an important advantage of the tracking-based scheme is that it does not drastically
change the prices throughout the sixty days (the maximum change is < 2%, see Fig. 7b). This
is unlike the optimal pricing scheme, where the change is 10%. From a cloud service provider
point of view, the optimal scheme is not ideal since the pricing fluctuates heavily and may alienate
users who expect some consistency in the pricing scheme. First-come-first-serve keeps a constant
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Day number
2000
2250
2500
2750
Su
m
 u
til
iti
es Tracking-based
Optimal
First-come-first-serve
Figure 6: Sum utilities for three resource allocation schemes
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Day number
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Su
m
 u
til
ity
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 ti
er
Tracking-based
Optimal
First-come-first-serve
(a) Utility in the first tier across 60 days
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Day number
0.55
0.56
0.57
0.58
0.59
0.60
Pr
ice
 c
ha
rg
ed
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 ti
er
Tracking-based
Optimal
First-come-first-serve
(b) Corresponding price charged by the cloud
provider
Figure 7: Utility and price charged in the first tier
pricing scheme, but it reduces the optimal utility by a factor of 2. Hence, the tracking-based scheme
represents an optimal trade-off between utility and fluctuation in pricing (and this trade-off can be
controlled by the number of gradient steps in Algorithm 1). Moreover, the tracking-based scheme
does not require the utility information from users, alleviating potential privacy concerns.
In Fig. 8, we pick a random user and plot her obtained utility and price paid throughout
the sixty days. Again, the tracking-based utility is extremely close to the optimal utility of the
user. Furthermore, even though the pricing obtained through the tracking-based scheme does not
fluctuate much, we see that the revenue obtained from the user is very close to the optimal revenue.
This is because by slightly changing the prices according to the mood of the market, the cloud
provider is able to nudge the users to update their budget to go close to the optimal budgets.
6 Future work
Our analysis and simulations show that there are several advantages of using dynamic multi-tier
pricing over basic pricing. This is only the first step towards designing practical game-theoretic
resource allocation schemes for the cloud. Some directions for future research, of interest to both
industry and academia, are–
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Utility-based pricing for serverful systems: The schemes developed in this paper can be
extended to the serverful case provided the assumption that one function requires one machine and
unit time holds. This assumption is more restrictive for the serverful case since the jobs can be
large. However, in such scenarios, a large job can be broken into several smaller jobs, each of
which requires unit time and machine. But this also introduces dependencies between jobs of a
user which need to be taken into account in problem formulation. We explain this in more detail
next.
Job dependencies: Often, certain jobs are recurrent and require execution of some other spe-
cific jobs for their execution. These dependencies are generally represented as a graph. An impor-
tant future direction is to design improved schedulers that take into account such job dependencies.
Ideally, jobs which have low dependencies or that have more reliable request-for-execution times
should get a discount in their pricing because they allow the scheduler to plan more efficiently.
Wholesale discount: Current pricing schemes lack a wholesale discount for customers who
are requesting large number of jobs with low variability in job sizes. Scheduling such jobs is
cheaper for the provider since it can rent entire clusters of machines together, resulting in better
resource utilization due to efficient bin packing.
Flexible SLAs with probabilistic guarantees: Cloud service providers define strict Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) for their services, e.g. in AWS Lambda, users are credited 10% of their
incurred charges if the error rate of Lambda functions goes beyond 0.05%5. Note that providing
such strict and premium SLAs require high-level maintenance of the cloud, the costs of which
are indirectly borne by all the users. This may be unfair since some users could be equipped to
tolerate job failures [32, 33] and different users could have varying degrees of fault-tolerance. An
interesting future direction is to design pricing schemes that conform with each user’s preferences
using behavioral preference models from decision theory (see, for example, [34]).
Heterogeneity in machines and jobs: Currently, we have assumed that all the serverless ma-
chines/jobs have the same specifications in terms of their execution time, memory capacity, etc.
However, there is often heterogeneity both in the types of machines and jobs for such systems [9],
which can be taken into account in the problem formulation.
5For details, see https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/sla/historical/
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Revenue optimal schemes: In this paper we have focused on optimizing social welfare. An
alternative criteria would be to optimize the revenue generated by the cloud provider.
Stability analysis: Our algorithm is provably convergent to the optimal allocation and pricing
when the conditions are static, and seems to track the optimum when the network conditions vary
slowly. The impact of limited feedback on the ability to track the optimum will be a topic of further
studies.
7 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let x be any optimal resource allocation to SYS and let Ti the corresponding
end times as defined in (2.1). Without loss of generality, let the following ordering hold:
T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤ TN . (7.1)
As defined above, let x˜ be the greedy allocation corresponding to the ordering 1 ← 2 ← 3 ←
· · · ← N . Let T˜i be the end times corresponding to the allocation x˜. By construction of the greedy
allocation, we have
T˜i = min
{
t ∈ [T ] :
t∑
s=1
Mt ≥
i∑
j=1
Jj
}
, for all i ∈ [N ].
On the other hand, because of the ordering (7.1), we have
Ti ≥ min
{
t ∈ [T ] :
t∑
s=1
Mt ≥
i∑
j=1
Jj
}
, for all i ∈ [N ].
Thus, T˜i ≤ Ti, for all i ∈ [N ]. Hence
∑
i U
T˜i
i ≥
∑
i U
Ti
i and, thus, x˜ is also an optimal allocation.
Since x˜ is a non-preemptive scheduling, we have the statement in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose the resource allocation matrix xR ∈ RN×T is (N + T )-sparse
(which holds in a generic case as discussed earlier). In the optimal resource allocation xR for
SYS-LP, say a user i is getting non-zero resources in slots m and n (and say m < n), i.e. xim >
0, xin > 0 and a user j which is getting resources in slot m, i.e. xjm > 0. Then, by the optimality
of xR, we have
Pjm − Pjn ≥ Pim − Pin. (7.2)
We can easily prove the above by redistributing (> 0) fraction of the job from user j in slot m to
user i in slot m (and vice versa in slot n). But we know that this can only decrease the objective
function in SYS-LP, that is
(Pim − Pin)− (Pjm − Pjn) ≤ 0,
which proves Eq. (7.2).
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Now, we are ready to prove the theorem. From Eq. (2.10), we get that
V R − V ∗
V R
≤ V
R − Vˆ
V R
where Vˆ is the objective of SYS-LP obtained by projecting solution of SYS-LP to integer con-
straints as described in Eq. (2.9). Now, our aim is to upper bound the RHS above to get an upper
bound on the gap. To that end, we bound the numerator and denominator at each time slot t ∈ [T ].
Let V Rt and Vˆt be the corresponding utilities obtained only at tier t ∈ [T ], i.e.
V Rt :=
N∑
i=1
uity
R
it and Vˆt :=
N∑
i=1
uityˆit,
where yRit and yˆit,∀i, t, are as defined in (2.8) and (2.9), respectively. Let TRi be the time at which
the job of user i are getting finished according to the resource allocation xR, that is,
TRi := min{t ∈ [T ] :
t∑
s=1
xRis ≥ Ji}.
Thus, for time slot t, we have
V Rt − Vˆt
V Rt
=
∑
i∈St(Pit − PiTRi )xRit∑N
j=1 Pjtx
R
jt
, (7.3)
where St is the set of users for which 0 < xRit < Ji. Formally, St := {i ∈ [N ], 0 < xRit < Ji}. We
can further write
V Rt − Vˆt
V Rt
≤
∑
i∈St
(Pit − PiTRi )xRit∑N
j=1(Pjt − PjTRj )xRjt
≤
∑
i∈St
(Pit − PiTRi )xRit
(Pit − PiTRi )
∑N
j=1 x
R
jt
, (7.4)
where the last inequality uses Eq. (7.2). Now, since at time t, user i is getting fractional resources,
it implies that the system is operating at full capacity, that is
∑N
j=1 xjt =Mt. Hence, we get
V Rt − Vˆt
V Rt
≤
∑
i∈S
xRit
Mt
≤
∑
i∈S
maxi(Ji)
Mt
, (7.5)
where the last inequality uses the fact that xRit ≤ maxi(Ji). Also, since xR is (N+T )–sparse, there
are at most T instances where users are getting only partially resources allocated. Thus, |St| ≤ T ,
and, we get
V Rt − Vˆt
V Rt
≤ T maxi(Ji)
Mt
≤ T maxi(Ji)
mintMt
. (7.6)
Thus,
V R − V ∗ ≤ V R − Vˆ =
T∑
t=1
(V Rt − Vˆt) ≤
T maxi(Ji)
mintMt
T∑
t=1
V Rt =
T maxi(Ji)
mintMt
V R, (7.7)
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Rearranging, we get
V ∗ ≥
(
1− T (maxi Ji)
mintMt
)
V R,
which proves the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The Lagrangian for the user problem USER(i) is given by
L(mi, pi) =
T∑
t=1
mit
µt
(Pit − µt) + pi
(
Ji − mit
µt
)
, ∀i ∈ [N ], (7.8)
where pi is the dual variable corresponding to the job size constraint in the user problem (see (4.1)).
The KKT conditions can, thus, be written as
µt + pi
{
= Pit, if mit > 0
≥ Pit, if mit = 0,
∀i, t, (7.9)
T∑
t=1
mit
µt
{
= Ji, if pi > 0
≤ Ji, if pi = 0,
∀t. (7.10)
Similarly, for the CLOUD problem, the Lagrangian is given by
L(x,q) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
mit log xit +
T∑
t=1
qt
(
Mt −
N∑
i=1
xit
)
, (7.11)
where q = (qt, t ∈ [N ]) is the dual variable corresponding to the total compute resource constraint
in the CLOUD problem (see (4.2)). The corresponding KKT conditions are
mit = xitqt, ∀i, t (7.12)
N∑
i=1
xit
{
=Mt, if qt > 0
≤Mt, if qt = 0,
∀t. (7.13)
Now, observe that any solution (x,λ,µ) to the system KKT conditions in Eqs. (3.2), (3.3) and
(3.4) also satisfies the KKT conditions for the USER(i) problem for all i ∈ [T ] (Eqs. (7.9) and
(7.10)) and the CLOUD problem (Eqs. (7.12) and (7.13)) with q = µ,p = λ. Thus, it satisfies the
conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv).
We now prove the later assertion in the theorem. Let x,m,µ satisfy (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv).
Since x is a solution to the CLOUD problem, and mit = xitµt ∀ i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], we have that µt
is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier qt = µt as in (7.12), provided xit > 0 for at least one i.
If xit = 0 for all i, then
∑
i xit = 0 < Mt, and hence qt = µt = 0. Since (mit, t ∈ [T ]) solves the
USER(i) problem, there exist dual variables pi such that (7.9) and (7.10) hold. Taking λi = pi for
all i, we see that (x,µ,λ) satisfy the system KKT conditions (Eqs. (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4)). Thus x
solves the system problem as well.
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